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ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 9 SECURITY
INTERESTS-WHY SO MUCH DEFERENCE
TO THE JUNIOR SECURED PARTY?
C. Edward Dobbs*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Essay addresses the question whether the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or the Code) is dead or alive in the context of certain
remedies provisions set forth in Part 5 of Article 9. The Essay concludes that while far from dead, the patient is sick and in need of some
treatment. Unlike other areas of the Code in need of some resuscitation born of changes in the manner in which commercial transactions
are conducted, the illness found in certain provisions of Part 5 was
present at the creation. That the provisions have survived so long
without cure is more a testament to the ready adaptation of the commercial world to flaws in the statute than to the absence of a need for
reform.
In its Final Report dated December 1, 1992 (PEB Final Report),
the Article 9 Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code (PEB Study Committee) made numerous suggestions for revisions of certain provisions or official comments to Part 5 of Article 9.' This Essay does not attempt to address
the bulk of those recommendations. 2 Rather, this Essay focuses upon
those provisions of Part 5 that deal with the relative rights and duties
* C. Edward Dobbs is a partner at the law firm of Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs
in Atlanta, Georgia.
1. PERMANENT EDrrORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
STUDY GROUP REPORT].

CODE ARTICLE

9

REPORT

(Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter

2. Some of the more significant recommendations include the following: (1) expanding the class of parties entitled to notice of collateral dispositions; (2) eliminating the
requirement of possession in connection with a strict foreclosure; (3) authorizing a strict
foreclosure in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness; (4) permitting certain obligors who
have no interest in the collateral to give predefault waivers of certain rights or certain
duties of the secured party with respect to the collateral; (5) providing a "safe harbor" rule
for notices of collateral dispositions; (6) clarifying the categories of Part 5 rights and remedies that may be altered by agreement of the parties; (7) eliminating the so-called absolute
bar rule in favor of the so-called rebuttable presumption rule applicable to commercially
unreasonable dispositions of collateral; and (8) expanding the pool of aggrieved parties
who may claim damages under § 9-507. See id. at 199-247.
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of junior and senior secured parties in connection with the foreclosure
process. This Essay concludes that those provisions are unjustifiably
tilted in favor of the junior secured party and should be revised, in
several instances along the lines suggested by the PEB Study
Committee.
II. COMMERCIAL REALITIES AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS

A secured party whose willingness to extend credit is based upon
the value of collateral to secure the credit extension should, and usually will, take steps to perfect its security interest and to confirm by
record search the priority that its Minterest will enjoy. If the search
reveals a prior encumbrance upon the collateral, then the secured
party faces a choice: decline to extend the requested cedit, condition
the credit extension upon the release or subordination of the prior
encumbrance, or proceed with the credit transaction notwithstanding
the prior encumbrance.
A secured party who extends credit with knowledge of a prior
security interest, and notwithstanding its existence, may be described
as an "advertent junior secured party." An advertent junior should be
distinguished from an "inadvertent junior" who intended to obtain a
senior security interest but failed to do so-whether as a result of misfiling, lapse of filing, or otherwise. A third category of junior is one
whose credit decision is unmotivated by the priority of the security
interest it receives and who accepts the profferred collateral position
without inquiry into its value-that is, "for whatever it's worth."
Whether advertent, inadvertent, or indifferent, the junior understands that its priority will not be elevated until the senior claim is
paid in full. The senior's foreclosure will extinguish the junior's security interest and the junior will not be entitled to notice of the senior's
foreclosure-or to any surplus resulting therefrom-unless the junior
gives timely notice of its interest in the collateral as required by section 9-504(3).'
In the commercial world, the goals of the advertent and indifferent junior are the same-to position themselves with respect to the
collateral ahead of any secured parties whose interests are later in
time and ahead of all unsecured creditors. It is not their expectation
to leapfrog over the senior's position through a preemptive, first3. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1990).
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strike foreclosure.4 The inadvertent junior, whose goal from the inception of the credit extension was to attain a senior position, must,
unfortunately, conform its expectations to the reality of its situation.
Another goal of the junior is to obtain leverage over the debtor. If a
default occurs, the junior's interest in the collateral empowers it to use
the threat of foreclosure to force action on the part of the debtor.
These goals of the junior generally can coexist peacefully with the
primary, bargained-for goal of the senior, which is to have the paramount right to conduct and receive the proceeds from any disposition
of the collateral. Many provisions in Part 5 of Article 9 literally confer
rights upon the junior that are at odds with the normal commercial
expectations of the parties, thereby creating unnecessary conflict between the junior and the senior. On occasion intercreditor agreements resolve these conflicts between the senior and junior, with the
contractual resolution typically varying the Article 9 rules that might
otherwise favor the junior. Absent a contractual resolution, some
courts construe the relevant provisions of Part 5 in a manner that is
inconsistent with their plain meaning in order to achieve a result that
is more consistent with commercial realities and expectations. Secured parties by intercreditor agreement, and some courts by artificial
construction, attempt to circumvent the Code's plain meaning regarding a junior's enforcement fights. The Code should therefore be
amended to conform to commercial practice.
III.

COLLECTION RIGHTS OF THE JUNIOR

Section 9-502(1) of the Code entitles a secured party, after default, to notify an account debtor or an obligor on an instrument to
make payment to the secured party. Section 9-318(3) adds teeth to
the secured party's collection remedy. This section requires the account debtor to pay the notifying secured party, instead of the debtor,
when the account debtor receives notice of the debtor's assignment of
the right to payment.5
But what if an account is subject to multiple security interests?
May a junior secured party exercise collection rights and, if so, retain
4. There is some question whether an advertent or indifferent junior whose security
interest is obtained in knowing violation of a negative-pledge clause in a senior's security
interest should have any recourse to the collateral.
5. U.C.C. § 9-318(3) (1990). Indeed, the account debtor's failure to pay the secured
party may result in the account debtor's having to pay again. See, e.g., Valley Nat'l Bank v.
Flagstaff Dairy, 570 P.2d 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
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the proceeds in derogation of the senior's interests? 6 If the account
debtor receives conflicting payment directives from several assignees
of the account, to whom is payment to be made? Article 9 does not
adequately resolve these questions.
By not expressly prohibiting a junior from exercising collection
rights, the Code inferentially allows the junior to do so. Unlike a junior's disposition of tangible collateral, where the senior at least retains
its interest in the collateral, the collection of an account or an instrument extinguishes the underlying collateral to the extent of payment.7
Absent a rule entitling the senior to receive the junior's collection proceeds, the senior's priority interest in the collateral is rendered
valueless.'
.
The senior's ability to follow the junior's collection notice with a
notice of its own does not obviate the senior's concerns over the junior's initiation of collection. First, Article 9 does not clearly identify
who the account debtor must pay in the event of its receipt of conflicting notifications. The account debtor cannot be expected to resolve
priority contests; it may elect to honor the first collection notice it
receives-or neither of them. Second, the right to exercise the section
9-502 collection remedy is not conditioned upon giving prior notice to
either the debtor or other secured parties. Accordingly, there is no
assurance that the senior would have forewarning of the junior's exercise of such a remedy. Finally, the experience of many financial institutions that are expert in dealing with accounts collateral is that
account debtors who are confronted with conflicting demands for payment usually refuse to pay anyone. In such circumstances the secured
parties may have to bear the otherwise avoidable cost and delays of
litigation.
6. PEB Commentary No. 7, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
(Mar. 10, 1990), states that a party who holds a junior security interest in an account and
receives the account debtor's check in payment of the account, whether directly from the
account debtor or by way of negotiation from the debtor, may retain the check as against
the claim of a party holding a senior interest in the account if the junior is a holder in due
course of the account. See U.C.C. § 9-309. This PEB Commentary addresses a different
question than the one discussed in the text, which looks to the entitlement of the junior to

exercise § 9-502 collection rights in the first instance and thereafter to retain the collection
proceeds.
7. The junior might also elect to compromise the amount of the debtor's claim against
the account debtor, which presumably would bind not only the debtor but also the senior
secured party, whose existence was unknown to the account debtor.
8. Although there is a dearth of case law, the prevailing view appears to be that the
junior must account for and turn over to the senior any proceeds that the junior collects
under § 9-502. See, eg., New Hampshire Business Dev. Corp. v. F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc.,
832 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1987); Delaware Thuck Sales, Inc. v. Wilson, 618 A.2d 303 (N.J. 1993).
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Commercial lenders and factors typically seek to avoid the risks
posed by a junior interest in accounts collateral in one of two ways:
(1) by exacting the debtor's agreement to refrain from granting further encumbrances upon the collateral; or (2) by conditioning their
consent to a subordinate security interest in the accounts upon the
junior's agreement to forebear from exercising collection rights altogether until the senior's claim is paid in full.9 Given that commercial
institutions routinely address these problems by agreement, Article 9
might be revised to embody the customary expectations of the parties
and thereby dispense with the necessity for such agreements.
The PEB Study Committee suggests augmenting the official comments to explain that a junior may receive and retain collections from
an account debtor if the junior acts in "good faith" and "without
knowledge that the collections violate the rights of a [s]enior. ' ;10 The

committee's proposed good faith and knowledge test, however, addresses only the circumstances under which the junior is authorized to
retain collections. The test does not address the junior's right to initiate collection efforts in the first place. Further, unless the junior is
charged with knowledge of senior interests perfected of record, the
junior may be unaware of the existence of a senior and consequently
fail to give notice to the senior of the junior's initiation of collection.
Article 9 should be amended to provide that, absent a contrary
agreement among the parties, a junior may not invoke the section 9502 collection remedy unless it has first given reasonable notification
of its intention to exercise such a remedy. Such notification must be
given to each senior who holds an interest of record in the account11
or who is otherwise known to have a senior interest in the account or
an instrument. If the senior fails to exercise its collection remedy with
respect to the collateral prior to the expiration of the notice period,
the junior would be authorized to proceed with collection efforts.
However, the junior would be bound to account for all collections and
to turn them over to the senior net of the junior's reasonable collection expenses. If at any time the senior elects to initiate collection, the
junior would be required to discontinue its collection efforts with respect to any account debtor to whom the junior had not theretofore
9. Alternatively, the intercreditor agreement may sanction the junior's assertion of
collection rights. However, the sanction applies only if the senior fails to assert such rights
for a period of time after receiving notice of the junior's intent to exercise § 9-502 rights,
and then only if the net proceeds of the junior's collection are turned over to the senior.
10. SrtuDy GRoUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 222.
11. Notice should be required without regard to whether or not the senior gave written
notice to the junior of the senior's interest in the collateral.
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sent a section 9-502 collection notice.12 The account debtor should be
exonerated from any liability if, faced with conflicting claims to payment, it acts in good faith and remits payment to any secured party to
whom payment would otherwise have been proper if a notification
had been received only from that party.
The foregoing proposals satisfy a number of legitimate concerns
of the parties involved in a collection context. The proposals preserve
the junior's leverage over the debtor by permitting the junior to initiate collection, but only after giving reasonable notice to the senior and
subject to the senior not proceeding with its own collection efforts.
While the junior must turn over all collections to the senior, it is allowed to deduct reasonable expenses. The likelihood of an account
debtor being confronted with conflicting collection notices is reduced.
And in the event of such conflicting notices, the account debtor is protected if it acts in good faith and pays any of the parties who would
have been entitled to payment in the absence of conflicting notices.
IV.

JUNIOR'S RIGHT TO FORECLOSE

Article 9 does not reserve to a senior secured party the exclusive
right to foreclose upon collateral that is subject to subordinate security interests. The clear indication from the language of Article 9, and
the consensus of authority,13 is that a junior has the right to dispose of
the collateral after default despite the presence of senior interests. A
contrary rule would strip the junior of its bargained-for leverage over
the debtor, subject the junior's enforcement rights to the potential
whim of prior interest holders, and, ironically, place the junior in a
potentially less advantageous position than an unsecured creditor who
obtains a judgment against the debtor. 4
To acknowledge the propriety of a rule that permits the junior to
foreclose, however, is not to say that the senior interest holders are
undeserving of certain additional protections that should inure to
them by virtue of their senior status. One fundamental protection is
the senior's right to notice. As currently written, Article 9 limits the
class of secured parties entitled to notice to those parties from whom
the foreclosing secured party has received written notice of a claim of
12. This proposal is consistent with the PEB Study Committee's recommendation that
a junior who has repossessed collateral be required to turn over the collateral to the senior
who requests it and has a right to possession as against the debtor. STuDY GROUP RE.
PORT, supra note 1, at 220.
13. See cases cited infra note 27.
14. See U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1990).
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an interest in the collateral.15 When a junior proposes to dispose of
collateral after default, the junior should be obliged to give notice to
all senior secured parties whose interests are of record in the state or
are otherwise known to the junior.'6 The senior's receipt of notice
would enable it to take appropriate steps to monitor the junior's foreclosure or, as hereinafter discussed, to interdict it.
If a junior is the first to repossess collateral and to notice a foreclosure sale, a senior has no express right under Article 9 to require
the junior to turn the collateral over to the senior for disposition
under Part 5 of Article 9.17 The PEB Study Committee recommends
revisions to Article 9 or the official comments to clarify "that a
[s]enior is entitled to recover possession .of the collateral from a
[]unior if. the [s]enior has the right to possession as against the
debtor."" An interdiction of the junior's foreclosure, however,
should be permitted only when the senior intends to follow through
with its own disposition of collateral and not to reinstate the possession of the debtor.
The PEB Study Committee's recommendation is appropriate and
strikes a fair balance between the rights of the junior and senior secured parties. The party having the senior interest in the collateral
can gain control of the collateral from the junior and superintend the
disposition of its collateral; the junior will receive any surplus after
satisfaction of the senior's claim. If the senior's claim is small in relation to the value of the collateral or the amount of the junior claim,
the junior may elect to redeem the collateral 19 or purchase it at a public sale by the senior. The senior, meanwhile, is constrained in the
manner of its disposition by the commercial reasonableness requirements of Article 9. The junior may sue the senior under section 9507(1) if the senior fails to conduct a commercially reasonable sale.
15. Id. § 9-504(3).
16. The effect of this rule would be to resurrect the pre-1972 text of § 9-504(3) insofar
as notices to senior secured parties are concerned. It is not suggested that the same rule
apply to notices by the subordinate to secured parties junior to it or notices by the senior to
any other secured party. In those circumstances the current rule works well. It is little
burden upon a junior to send to each senior, whose identity can be ascertained at the time
the junior obtains its interest, a notice of the junior's interest in the collateral. It is a far
greater-and unnecessary-burden on a senior to update periodically its UCC searches to
determine whether the debtor has further encumbered the collateral.
17. At least one case has recognized such a requirement on the part of the junior. E.g.,
American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc., 576 P.2d 566 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
18. SruDy GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 220-22. Of course, there may be circumstances in which the senior is unable to freely exercise its remedies, such as when the senior
has been temporarily enjoined or is otherwise embroiled in litigation with the debtor.

19. U.C.C. § 9-506.
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Finally, the junior's ability to enforce its interest after default, and
thereby precipitate a chain of events that will lead to ultimate realization upon the collateral, preserves the junior's leverage against the
debtor.
V.

JUNIOR'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE AND RETAIN FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDS

Section 9-504(1) establishes how to apply proceeds realized from
the disposition of collateral. Section 9-504(1)(a) directs that such proceeds are to be first applied to the reasonable repossession and foreclosure expenses and-to the extent authorized by the security
agreement and not prohibited by law-legal expenses incurred by the
secured party. The balance20 is to be applied first to the satisfaction of
the secured party's claim and then to the claim of any junior from
whom the foreclosing secured party has received, before final distribution of the proceeds, a "written notification of demand therefor.""1
If the secured party conducting the collateral disposition is the
holder of the senior interest, then, with one exception, the application

rules of section 9-504(1) work well. The exception is the requirement
that the proceeds remaining after payment of the senior's claim be
remitted to the holder of a subordinate security interest. Literally
read, this requirement directs the senior to skip over a statutory or

common-law lienor whose lien, though inferior to the senior's, is superior under applicable law to the subordinate security interest. Because the senior's foreclosure discharges that lien,

it would be

palpably unfair to pass over the lienor in favor of a subordinate security interest with respect to the surplus proceeds? 3 While such a result

was likely not intended, the imprecise language employed in section 920. The likelihood of a surplus will depend not only upon the realizable value of the
collateral in relation to that claim but also upon the nature of the collateral. When the
collateral is a single, indivisible item such as an automobile, airplane, or printing press, the
secured party has little choice other than to dispose of the entirety of the collateral and, if a
surplus results, the surplus application rules of § 9-504(1) will be relevant. On the other
hand, when the collateral consists of inventory or accounts, the secured party usually will
foreclose upon only so much of the collateral as is necessary to satisfy its claim and thereupon relinquish possession of any remaining collateral.
21. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1990).
22. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4), which states that the secured party's disposition of collateral
"discharges" its security interest and "any security interest or lien subordinate thereto."
23. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4.06[3], at 4-99 (rev. ed. 1993) ("It is unfortunate that [§ 9504(1)(c)] gives junior judgment creditors no protection."). The PEB Study Committee
has recommended that the distribution rules of § 9-504(1) be revised to entitle the holder
of a subordinate non-UCC lien to receive a distribution of excess proceeds as long as the
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504(1) could subject the foreclosing secured party to potential liability

for failure to follow the letter of the law.
If, however, the junior forecloses upon the collateral, the question arises whether the junior is entitled under Article 9 to apply the
net proceeds to its claim in preference to the claim of the senior. If so,
should such a rule be changed?, The language of section 9-504(1) offers little comfort to a senior secured party. That section, far from
suggesting that the senior has first call on the disposition proceeds,
plainly states that the foreclosing secured party-without differentiating between senior and junior-takes first, then the subordinate security interest holders, and finally the debtor. 24 Under this reading of
Article 9, surplus disposition proceeds must always be passed down,
and never up, the priority ladder.'
Although this reading has the support of some respected com-

mentators, 26 the courts have not uniformly agreed with such a result.2 7

holder of the subordinate lien has given the senior timely written notice of a demand for
distribution. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 215.
24. An Article 9 junior secured party would appear to fare better under the Code in
this regard than a party holding an inferior non-Code lien. For example, in many states a
judgment lienor must turn over to a senior secured party the proceeds received from a
judicial sale. See, e.g., United States v. Monroe Serv. Co., 901 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1990).
25. See, e.g., First Union Nat'l Bank v. Tectamar, Inc., 235 S.E.2d 894 (N.C. Ct. App.
1977) (finding junior's payment of foreclosure proceeds to senior improper).
An interesting, but unanswered, question under Article 9 is whether § 9-504(1) requires a secured party to turn over the first proceeds from a collateral disposition to the
holder of a lien-for example, a judgment lien-that has priority under applicable nonUCC law. As discussed in the text, § 9-504(1) speaks only in terms of sharing proceeds
with junior secured parties and the debtor. Assume, for the sake of argument, that nonUCC applicable law requires the foreclosing secured party to satisfy prior statutory liens
from the foreclosure proceeds. If the statutory lien was superior to the foreclosing secured
party's interest but subordinate to the senior's interests, then Article 9 and non-UCC law
would oblige the junior to pass the realization proceeds upstream only to the extent necessary to satisfy a lien inferior to the senior's interest. This would be an anomalous result at
best.
26. See 2 JAMES J. WHrr & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 27-9, at 592-94 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994). But see Cynthia Starnes, U.C.C. Section 9504 Sales by JuniorSecured Parties: Is a Senior Party Entitled to Notice and Proceeds?, 52
U. Prrr. L. REv. 563 (1991).
27. For cases requiring the junior to remit the foreclosure proceeds to the senior, see
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England-Old Colony, N.A., 897 F.2d 611
(1st Cir. 1990); New Hampshire Business Dev. Corp. v. F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc., 832 F.2d
7 (1st Cir. 1987); In re Whatley, 126 B.R. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991); Stotts v. Johnson,
791 S.W.2d 351 (Ark. 1990); Consolidated Equip. Sales, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust
Co., 627 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1981); Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 649
(S.D. 1988).
For cases ruling that the junior has first rights to the disposition proceeds when the
junior conducts the sale, see United States v. Cohoon, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
316 (E.D.N.C. 1990); Continental Bank, N.A. v. Krebs, 540 N.E.2d 1023 (Ill. App. Ct.
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The rationale offered for a policy excluding the senior's right to share
in the junior's disposition proceeds is that the senior may always enforce its security interest in the collateral acquired by the purchaser at
foreclosure because the senior's interest is not discharged. But the
senior may not always be able to locate either the purchaser or the
collateral, particularly if the senior does not receive prior notice of the
foreclosure sale.2 Article 9 must be revised to require the junior to
give a disposition notice to the senior whether or not the senior has
previously notified the junior of the senior's security interest. If Article 9 is not so revised, the senior may not be alerted to the foreclosure
and thus may be unprepared to protect its interest. Furthermore, in
the case of a private sale of the collateral, notice from the junior of the
time after which the collateral may be sold will not necessarily inform
the senior of the actual date of the sale or the identity of the ultimate
purchaser. Such information may not even be known to the junior at
the time the notice of private sale is given. Apart from the issue of
notice, when the junior conducts a public sale of multiple items of
collateral in separate lots, it may be impractical or unduly expensive
for the secured party to retrieve the collateral from each purchaser.29
In any event what is the point of priority if the senior's rights and
expectations can be so easily defeated?
As for the good faith purchaser at foreclosure, what protection
does it have against subsequent loss of the collateral to the senior? It
has been suggested that the purchaser will take into account the existence of the senior's interest in determining the purchase price to be
paid to the junior.3" This suggestion assumes that the purchaser will
be aware of the senior's position, an assumption that may often be
1989); Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 459 N.W.2d 718 (Neb. 1990); First Union
Nat'l Bank, 235 S.E.2d at 894.
28. At least one court has ruled that the foreclosing secured party has no duty to disclose the identity of the buyer of the collateral to a senior lienor who has not given notice
of its interest in the collateral and that the foreclosing secured party does not act in bad
faith by refusing to reveal the buyer's name. Utility Trailers, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 726 P.2d 282 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986). The senior's right to follow the collateral
into the hands of the foreclosure purchaser is of little benefit if the senior does not receive
notice of the sale and if, after learning of the sale, the senior has no means of compelling
disclosure of the purchaser's identity.
29. If the senior appeared at the junior's public auction threatening to repossess on the
spot each item sold, the senior could effectively scuttle the sale. What is the logic of a
system that would permit a junior to foreclose and retain the foreclosure proceeds as
against a senior, who, having possibly no other means of protection, is forced to frustrate
the sale or defeat the interests of the purchasers?
30. Sntuy GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 219.
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incorrect. 3 ' Even if the existence of a senior lien is known to a prospective purchaser, the purchaser may not have adequate information
about the amount of the senior's claim to calculate a net purchase
price. The suggestion also assumes that the senior's claim is less than
the value of the collateral to be sold. If the collateral exceeded the
value of the senior's claim, an informed purchaser presumably would
not conclude the purchase unless it did not expect the senior to demand the purchased collateral.
More to the point, however, a knowing purchaser will likely take
into account the risk associated with an undischarged senior lien and
adjust the purchase price accordingly. Consequently, why not simply
put the burden upon the junior to collect the amount of the adjustment and remit it to the senior in satisfaction of the senior claim?
One may question whether a sale of an item of collateral for less than
its acknowledged value, to reflect the purchaser's taking subject to the
senior's interest, is a commercially reasonable sale. The senior is certainly not obligated to pursue the collateral into the hands of the purchaser. If the senior elects not to do so, the purchaser receives a
windfall, the debtor remains liable to the senior for that portion of the
senior's claim that was not satisfied due to the adjustment in the
purchase price, and subordinate lienholders on remaining items of collateral subject to the senior's liens are harmed.
VI. Ei-cr ON JUNIOR OF SENIOR'S STRICT FORECLOSURE
Section 9-505(2) of the Code permits a secured party to conduct a
so-called strict foreclosure by proposing, in writing, to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. The foreclosing secured party must
send the proposal to the debtor and any .other secured party from
whom the foreclosing secured party has received a timely written no31. Of course the purchaser may conduct a record search to ascertain the existence of
such liens. In practice, however, such searches are infrequently conducted except in negotiated private sales.
The PEB Study Committee recommends that Article 9 or the official comments be
revised to state explicitly that absent a disclaimer or modification, the foreclosing secured
party will be deemed to have made warranties of title in a foreclosure sale. Id. at 218-19.
In determining whether to disclaim or limit such a warranty, the prudent secured party
would undertake a record search to verify the existence of any superior security interest or
liens. If so, the secured party presumably would disclose them to the purchaser, who in
turn would take those liens into account in calculating the price the purchaser is willing to
pay at foreclosure. If this suggestion is adopted, it would not increase the burden upon the
foreclosing secured party to provide a disposition notice to those identified as holders of
senior interests in the collateral, regardless of whether such seniors have notified the foreclosing secured party of their security interests in the collateral.
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tice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. If a person entitled to
receive the secured party's strict foreclosure proposal gives notice of
an objection to the proposal within twenty-one days, the foreclosing
secured party must dispose of the collateral by public or private sale
under section 9-504; otherwise, the secured party becomes the owner
of the collateral and the secured debt is deemed satisfied.
Strict foreclosure may be an attractive remedy when the amount
of the secured party's claim exceeds any reasonable valuation that
may be placed upon the collateral, the secured party does not have
other collateral or a solvent obligor from which to recover a deficiency, and the secured party desires to effect a speedy and economical disposition. However, the potential usefulness of the strict
foreclosure option is sorely limited under section 9-505 as currently
written. Unlike section 9-504, a strict foreclosure under section 9-505
does not expressly discharge junior security interests and liens on the
collateral. While some support exists for the proposition that a strict
foreclosure does extinguish junior encumbrances,3 2 there is sufficient
room for doubt. Thus, reliance upon the strict foreclosure remedy is a
risky venture when junior encumbrances exist.
The PEB Study Committee has suggested a revision to Article 9
to clarify that a strict foreclosure extinguishes all junior encumbrances-both junior security interests and non-UCC liens-on the
collateral.33 Such a revision would enhance the utility of strict foreclosure and should be adopted.
VII. JUNIOR'S WAIVER OF SENIOR'S DuTy OF COMMERCIAL
REASONABLENESS

Under section 9-507(1), if a secured party disposes of collateral in
a commercially unreasonable manner, "any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been made known to the secured
party prior to the disposition" has a right to recover from the secured
party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of Part
5.34

Frequently, two creditors in a commercial transaction will extend
loans or other financial accommodations to a debtor at the same time.
One creditor is the senior secured lender and the other, the junior,
provides funding that is contractually subordinated only to the senior.
32. See Food City, Inc. v. Fleming Cos., 590 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); 2 GRANT
GIuMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.3, at 1225-26 (1965).

33. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 244-45.
34. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1990).
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The junior often requests a second lien, behind the senior, with respect to the same assets of the debtor that the senior's security interest
encumbers. The senior may very well balk at the notion of consenting
to a junior encumbrance upon the collateral, 5 for by doing so, the
senior may assume unwanted duties and potential liabilities to the junior with respect to the senior's handling of a disposition of collateral.
Hence, an informed senior usually conditions consent for the
grant of a junior encumbrance upon the junior's execution of an intercreditor agreement that addresses a number of issues. In addition to
establishing the priorities of the parties' respective interests in the collateral, the intercreditor agreement likely will call upon the junior to
stand by from any enforcement of its lien until the senior's claim is
paid in full and to turn over any proceeds of collateral that may come
into the junior's possession. Further, the senior may insist that the
subordinate lender agree in advance to release its lien in connection
with the debtor's postdefault liquidation of the collateral for the senior's benefit. This agreement prevents the junior from holding the
collateral hostage in such a situation.
The senior may potentially assume liability to a junior for failure
to comply with Part 5. Thus, the senior will be more inclined to consent to a junior interest if the subordinate lender can effectively waive
the senior's duty to the junior to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. The indifferent junior can be expected to
give such a waiver freely. The advertent junior must again make a
credit decision, but often will be willing to waive the senior's commercial reasonableness duties on the belief that any disposition of the collateral is more likely to occur in the context of the debtor's
36
bankruptcy than by the senior's enforcement of its security interest.
- It is not altogether clear, however, whether the subordinate
lender may effectively waive the senior's obligation to conduct a commercially reasonable disposition of the collateral, Section 9-501(3) establishes various rights of the debtor and duties of the secured party
that may not be waived or varied by agreement between the two. One
of the duties of a secured party that may not be waived or varied is
35. The senior's consent is generally necessary because the senior's security agreement
prohibits the debtor from granting other security interests in the collateral.
36. Such a waiver might also enhance the marketability of the collateral in a foreclosure sale. Under § 9-504(4) a purchaser at public foreclosure takes free of junior liens only
if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in the sale. A purchaser presumably
would have less concern with a potential noncompliance insofar as a junior lienholder is
concerned if the junior had waived its rights to challenge the commercial reasonableness of
the disposition.
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liability under section 9-507 for failure to comply with Part 5. Such
liability extends to a secured party's failure to conduct a commercially
reasonable disposition of the collateral. Section 9-501(3) does not, by
its terms, prohibit two secured parties-a senior and a junior-from
agreeing to waive rights that they might otherwise have against one
another by virtue of their noncompliance with Part 5.37
Section 1-102(3), however, broadly invalidates purported contractual disclaimers of the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care imposed by the Code. That section has been invoked to
nullify debtors' written disclaimers of the commercial reasonableness
requirement 38 and would appear to apply with equal force to disclaimers by junior secured parties.
In light of the uncertainty, Article 9 should be revised to clarify
that secured parties may make such agreements and give such waivers
as they deem appropriate as between themselves and subject to the
usual contract doctrines relating to good faith, unconscionability, duress, and adhesion contracts. 9 Such a revision would facilitate the
willingness of senior secured parties to consent to junior encumbrances and would eliminate the current uncertainty about the effectiveness of such waivers. There appear to be no valid reasons for
Article 9 to inhibit freedom of contract between secured parties.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Part 5 of Article 9, by literal reading or clear implication, purports to confer enforcement rights upon junior secured parties that
exceed their legitimate commercial expectations and may defeat the
bargained-for rights of seniors. Practice demonstrates that juniors are
usually unhesitant in waiving many of those rights and that seniors
routinely insist upon such waivers in exchange for their consent to the
debtor's grant of a junior interest in the collateral.
When the junior interest is created without the knowledge of the
senior, and possibly in violation of the senior's security agreement, the
senior is unable to exact the customary waivers from the junior in an
37. Instead, § 9-501(3) prohibits a waiver or variance only of those terms that "give
rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party." U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (emphasis
added). The conjunction allows one to interpret the section to proscribe only a waiver or
variance of the secured party's duty of commercial reasonableness vis-a-vis the debtor.
38. See, e.g., May v. Women's Bank, N.A., 807 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1991) (en bane).
39. There is authority for the proposition that a commercial guarantor should be able
to give predefault waivers of defenses that might arise from a commercially unreasonable
sale. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. H & H Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., 927 F.2d 270
(6th Cir. 1991).
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intercreditor agreement. In such circumstances many courts have declined to permit juniors to realize all of the benefits that Part 5 of
Article 9 confers upon them. In so doing, those courts have ignored
what some commentators believe to be the plain meaning of the Article 9 provisions in question.
Revision is needed to clarify the enforcement rights of juniors
and to conform the extent of those rights to commercial practice and
the legitimate expectations of the parties.
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